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When we observe the actions of another person, we predict 
what this person is going to do next in order to decide what 
his or her aim is and to adapt our own response accordingly. 
To do this, we take the characteristics of this observed per-
son into account. Imagine, for example, that you see a flo-
rist reaching for a vase. You could decide to offer help by 
handing it to him so he can use it to put flowers in. If, on the 
other hand, you see a small child reaching for the same 
vase, your prediction of the potential outcome will tell you 
that this might not be such a good idea, so you can inter-
vene with the child’s action and put the vase at an unreach-
able location. Previous research supports the idea that to 
interact with the world effectively, we use information from 
previous experiences to predict a specific visual stimulus 
(Den Ouden, Friston, Daw, McIntosh, & Stephan, 2009; 
Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008) or the outcomes of other 
people’s actions (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008). 
In this article, we explore the idea that predictions about the 
outcomes of other people’s actions arise in a generative 
model that has a hierarchical structure and consists of 
causal relations between different levels of this hierarchy.
This idea has its origin in the predictive processing 
framework. According to this framework, the brain is con-
tinuously predicting the input it will receive (Clark, 2013b; 
Friston, 2005). This means that our brains process 
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incoming information not in a purely bottom-up fashion, 
but by a cascade of predictions from higher level to lower 
level representations. The top-down neural signal then con-
sists of predicted states of the world and the bottom-up sig-
nal consists of the difference between these predictions and 
the actual input. These differences are called prediction 
errors. The framework assumes that if lower level represen-
tations are correctly predicted by higher level representa-
tions, this enhances processing, for example, in terms of 
speed (O’Reilly et al., 2013). However, when lower level 
representations are incorrectly predicted, additional pro-
cessing at higher levels is required to deal with the predic-
tion errors arising at lower levels.
In recent years, empirical evidence has been found to 
support the idea that the predictive processing framework 
successfully describes low-level sensory processing (e.g., 
Bastos et al., 2012; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012; 
Phillips, Blenkmann, Hughes, Bekinschtein, & Rowe, 
2015; Rao & Ballard, 1999; for a review, see Summerfield 
& de Lange, 2014). Some researchers have pressed that 
predictive processing may serve as a general account of 
brain functioning (e.g., Clark, 2013b; Friston, 2010; 
Hohwy, 2013), in which case it should also describe pro-
cessing at higher cognitive levels, including those 
involved in the processing of agent-caused events. Indeed, 
it has been suggested that neural responses to biological 
motion and other people’s beliefs and desires are modu-
lated by the predictability of an event, in compliance with 
the features of predictive processing (Kilner, Friston, & 
Frith, 2007; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). In accordance 
with this idea, top-down and bottom-up signals in the 
brain have been found to be modulated by the probability 
of an agent-caused event (Van Pelt et al., 2016). Yet, little 
is known still about the potential cognitive principles that 
govern the prediction of action outcomes from agent 
information. In this article, we test whether a hierarchical 
predictive processing model is, in principle, able to 
account for the way in which we process the outcomes of 
other people’s actions. We specifically explore a model in 
which the predictive relations between levels of the gen-
erative model are causal.
To study our hypothesis in a naturalistic but con-
trolled setting, we used a behavioural paradigm in which 
participants viewed animated movies of people playing a 
bowling game. In these movies, the agent’s action (i.e., 
throwing a bowling ball) caused an outcome (i.e., the 
pins were knocked down). In Experiment 1, the specific 
outcome (i.e., the score) could be predicted based on 
identification of the agent, that is, knowledge about the 
performance of this agent on previous trials. There were 
two agents, indicated as the novice and the experienced 
player, who usually obtained a low and a high score, 
respectively. In 25% of all trials, however, players 
obtained scores that were incongruent with their skills. 
According to the model that we explore here, such an 
incongruence results in a prediction error at the level of 
the hierarchy at which “outcome” is represented. In the 
current bowling set-up, this prediction error should 
increase processing at the higher level of the hierarchy at 
which the “agent” is represented, as this is where the 
prediction error needs to be “explained away”. To inves-
tigate the idea of a hierarchically organised model, we 
asked participants to report after each movie either 
which agent (“experienced” or “novice”) or which out-
come (“high score” or “low score”) they observed. For 
each of these two questions, reaction times were com-
pared for questions following predicted versus unpre-
dicted outcomes. Reaction times have previously been 
found to correlate with the improbability of an event 
(Bestmann et al., 2008; Den Ouden, Daunizeau, Roiser, 
Friston, & Stephan, 2010) and are therefore assumed to 
reflect the prediction error. Given the predictive process-
ing model that we investigate here, we hypothesise that 
the observation of an unpredicted outcome slows down 
the response to a question about the agent, as the predic-
tion error arising at the outcome level is to be explained 
away at the agent level, requiring additional processing 
at that level and thereby slowing down the reporting of 
the inferred agent information. In other words, we pre-
dicted a longer reaction time for the agent question if it 
followed an unpredicted rather than a predicted out-
come, as a prediction error needs to be explained away at 
this level. On the other hand, as a prediction error is 
assumed to be explained away at a level above, not at the 
level at which the error occurs itself, a prediction error 
occurring specifically at the outcome level is not 
expected to influence the reaction times for the outcome 
question. In this way, measuring reaction times for these 
questions affords us to test the hypothesis of a hierarchi-
cally structured predictive model in which information 
about agents is processed at a higher level in this model 
than information about outcomes.
Furthermore, we explored the role of knowledge 
about the causal structure of the world in the prediction 
of the outcomes of agent-caused events. Predicting what 
types of outcomes are likely produced by what types of 
agents presupposes a generative model that encodes 
such world knowledge. This knowledge tells us that 
some agents have a propensity to cause some events 
more often than others. For instance, a skilled bowler is 
more likely to hit a strike than a novice bowler. Also, we 
know that agents may cause certain events but not oth-
ers. A person may cause an object to fall, but not the sun 
to shine. This seems to be mainly the result of knowl-
edge about the mechanisms that cause events (Shultz, 
Fisher, Pratt, & Rulf, 1986). The influence of this type of 
knowledge also explains why young children are more 
likely to expect the movement of an object to be caused 
by an agent rather than by a train (Saxe, Tzelnic, & 
Carey, 2007), why people only learn to associate a tone 
Heil et al. 2645
with an air puff if they are aware of the link between the 
two (Clark & Squire, 1998), and why the remembered 
speed of a movement is influenced by the effect it seems 
to have caused in Michotte’s (1963) launching effect 
paradigm (Kerzel, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 
2000).
To investigate the hypothesis that a predictive process-
ing model with causal relations between the levels is able 
to account for the type of processing that occurs at high 
levels of the hierarchy where agent-caused events are rep-
resented, we compare the results of this first experiment 
with the results of two follow-up experiments. Whereas in 
Experiment 1, the outcomes of actions (number of pins 
thrown over by an agent) could be predicted based on 
knowledge about the agent (his propensity to throw high or 
low scores); in Experiment 2, we created a situation in 
which the outcome could only be predicted from a col-
oured patch next to the agent. Colours, unlike agents, do 
not cause outcomes. Therefore, if the predictions made in 
Experiment 1 were specifically based on causal knowl-
edge of agents causing outcomes, none of the effects pre-
dicted for Experiment 1 would be predicted for Experiment 
2. In Experiment 3, the predictive cue was the agent’s shirt 
colour. Given that according to world knowledge a shirt 
colour can be a cue to an agent’s identity, we would again 
expect the same reaction time effects in Experiment 3 as 
predicted for Experiment 1. On the other hand, if the pre-
dictions in all experiments would be merely based on non-
causal associations between two events, one would expect 
similar patterns for all experiments. The set of three exper-
iments together allows us to explore whether or not a hier-
archical predictive processing model with causal rather 
than non-causal relations between the levels can account 
for the processing of other agents’ actions. As such, we 




Participants. A total of 28 healthy, right-handed partici-
pants (22 females) aged between 18 and 26 (mean age 
22.6) years were recruited for the first experiment. They 
were paid €10 or received course credits for their partici-
pation. The study was approved by the institution’s local 
ethics committee (ECG2012-0910-058) and written 
informed consent was obtained from each participant.
Stimuli and design. A total of 24 animated movies of a bowl-
ing game was created using Autodesk’s 3ds Max 2014 and 
MotionBuilder 2014 (http://www.autodesk.com). These 
movies showed a bowling lane and one of two agents, who 
could be recognised by their clothing. The avatars for the 
bowling players were selected from Worldviz Vizard 
Complete Characters (http://www.worldviz.com/products/
avatars/complete-characters). In each movie, the agent 
threw a ball directed at the pins and disappeared at 1,200 ms 
after the start of the movie, to keep the visual display of the 
action outcome the same for the two agents. The ball then 
rolled towards the pins, either a little left or right of the cen-
tre and hit 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, or 8 pins. The kinematics of the ball 
movement only varied in terms of the direction and were not 
associated with a specific agent or outcome. Each movie 
lasted 5 s. By keeping the kinematics of the action constant, 
we were able to investigate predictions that are based on 
information about the agent, rather than on kinematics. In 
75% of all 288 trials, the outcome was as expected based on 
the agent’s skill level. This means that one agent, who was 
introduced to the participants as the novice player, received 
a low score (1, 2, or 3) in 108 out of 144 trials, whereas the 
other agent, who was introduced to the participants as the 
experienced player, received a high score (6, 7, or 8) in 108 
out of 144 trials. More specifically, within the category of 
low scores, a score of 2 was most frequent (96 out of 144 
trials), as was a score of 7 in the category of high scores 
(Figure 1). The other outcomes (i.e., 1, 3, 6, and 8) were 
included as fillers that provided variability in scores and 
thereby made the experiment more realistic. The movies 
were presented using Presentation software (version 17.2, 
http://www.neurobs.com).
Procedure. Participants were seated comfortably in front 
of the computer on which the experiment was presented. 
Instructions were presented on the screen and shortly 
repeated verbally. In the instructions, it was explained 
to participants that there were two agents, a novice and 
an experienced player, who usually (but not always) 
obtained scores that matched their skill level. In addi-
tion, participants were told that after each movie, they 
would be asked to answer one out of two questions, and 
that they should pay attention to everything they saw, as 
they would not know which question would be asked 
afterwards. They were also instructed to answer the 
question as quickly as possible. After the instructions, 
the participants performed four practice trials, in which 
they received information about which agent they would 
see, before the movie was presented. This allowed them 
to associate appearance of the agent with his skill level, 
as they would need this to perform the task. Immedi-
ately after each movie of the actual task, participants 
were asked to answer one out of two questions, which 
were presented in random order. One of the questions 
was about the agent (“Did you see the experienced or 
the novice player?”), whereas the other question was 
about the outcome (“Was the score high or low?”). The 
question was presented on the screen for 2 s, with the 
two answer options presented underneath. Participants 
answered by using their index fingers to press either the 
left button or the right button on a button box as quickly 
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as possible. The order of the answer options was ran-
domised to prevent motor preparation. In the practice 
trials, participants received feedback on the accuracy of 
their answer. This was not the case in the actual experi-
ment. After each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 
a duration that was randomised between 500 and 
2,500 ms.
Reaction times to the questions that followed movies in 
which the outcome was 2 or 7 were analysed using a 2 (agent: 
novice vs experienced player) × 2 (outcome: 2 vs 7) × 2 
(question: agent vs outcome) repeated measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA). The reaction times to questions that 
were answered incorrectly were not considered in this 
analysis. As all responses given after 2,000 ms were 
labelled incorrect, our final dataset did not include any tri-
als with very long reaction times. The data were checked 
for trials with very short reaction times (<100 ms), but no 
such trials were found. Furthermore, reaction times to 
questions following movies with outcomes 1, 3, 6, and 8 
were also not considered in the analysis, as they were 
included as fillers in the experiments to make the events 
look as naturalistic as possible and appeared very infre-
quently (a total of 32 out of 288 trials). Based on our 
hypothesis that additional processing is required at the 
agent level as a result of a prediction error, we anticipated 
that unexpected events (i.e., the novice agent obtaining a 
high score or the experienced agent a low score) would 
bring about longer reaction times than expected events (the 
novice agent obtaining a low score or the experienced 
agent a high score). This results in an anticipated interac-
tion effect between agent and outcome, specifically for the 
agent question.
Results and discussion
The analysis showed a significant three-way interaction 
between agent, outcome, and question, F(1, 27) = 7.41, 
p = .01, ηp
2 22= .  (Figure 2; see Supplementary Material for 
a full overview of results). Follow-up analyses showed 
that for the agent question, there was an interaction 
between agent and outcome, F(1, 27) = 18.95, p < .001, 
ηp
2 41= . . More specifically, paired-samples t-tests showed 
that, for this question, unexpected events resulted in higher 
reaction times for both the novice player, t(1, 27) = −4.00, 
p < .001, and the experienced player, t(1, 27) = 2.60, p = .02. 
Overall, participants were on average 46.8 ms slower to 
respond when the outcome was not as would be predicted 
from the agent’s skills, in line with the hypothesis that 
unexpected events result in a longer reaction time than 
expected events as a result of additional processing at the 
agent level. Such an effect did not appear when partici-
pants were asked about the outcome, where there was no 
interaction between agent and outcome, F(1, 27) = 0.80, 
p = .38, ηp
2 03= . . For this question, there only was a 
Figure 1. Overview of conditions and stimuli in Experiment 1.
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significant effect of outcome on reaction time F(1, 
27) = 19.36, p < .001, ηp
2 42= . . More specifically, a score 
of 7 resulted in a reaction time that was on average 36.9 ms 
longer than the reaction time following a score of 2.
Additional analyses confirmed that including the 
questions following movies that showed another outcome 
(i.e., 1, 3, 6, and 8) did not influence this pattern of 
results. Furthermore, the average accuracy over all trials 
was 95.2% (94.6% for the agent question and 95.8% for 
the outcome question), and the specific pattern of these 
data was incompatible with the possibility that the reac-
tion time effects were driven by a speed-accuracy 
trade-off.
The three-way interaction shows that the prediction 
effects differ between the two questions. As participants 
were not aware which question they would be asked after 
each movie, it is unlikely that they made predictions in one 
situation, but not in the other. Rather, it seems that specifi-
cally for the agent question, reaction times were influenced 
by the violation of the participant’s prediction. This is con-
sistent with the idea that prediction errors at the lower 
level of the causal hierarchy, that is, the outcome level, 
slow down the reporting of information at a higher level, 
that is, the agent level.
In this first experiment, predictions about the out-
come of another person’s action could be based on a 
causal relation between the agent and the outcome. To 
investigate the specificity of this type of prediction to 
this causal relation, we performed a second experiment 
in which the score could not be predicted based on the 
agent’s skills, but on an arbitrary statistical relation 
between a coloured box next to the agent and the out-
come. If people’s predictions indeed crucially depend on 
causal knowledge about agents causing outcomes, no 
effect on reaction times of predictability of events should 
be observed in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants. A total of 28 participants (23 females) aged 
between 19 and 29 (mean age 23.1) years took part in the 
second experiment. They were paid €10 or received course 
credits for their participation. The study was approved by 
the local ethics committee and written informed consent 
was obtained from each participant.
Stimuli and design. Out of the 24 animated movies from 
the first experiment, 12 movies with only one of the 
agents were selected. This means that there were still two 
ball directions (left and right) and six outcomes (1, 2, 3, 
6, 7, and 8). Instead of two different agents, there were 
now two different coloured boxes (yellow and blue). In 
each movie, one of these boxes was presented next to the 
agent. Like the agent, the box was presented from the 
beginning of the 5-s movie and disappeared after 
1,200 ms. The colour of the box correlated with the out-
come. If one colour was presented, the outcome was 
likely to be low, whereas if the other colour was pre-
sented, the outcome was likely to be high. The distribu-
tion of trials was the same as in the first experiment, with 
288 trials in total, of which 75% was as expected based 
on the colour of the box (Figure 3).
Procedure. The testing procedure was similar to the proce-
dure for the previous experiment. Although the instruc-
tions were also largely the same, participants were now 
told that they would see a blue or yellow box that would 
indicate whether the score is more likely to be high or low. 
As an example, they were told that one of the colours 
might indicate that the player would probably get a low 
score, but that this would not always be the case. Again, 
participants were explicitly informed about the association 
Figure 2. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for (a) the agent question and (b) the outcome question in Experiment 1, separately for 
bowler expertise and outcome (scores 2 and 7).
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between the colour and the outcome during the four prac-
tice trials. The questions that followed each movie were 
about the colour (“Was the box blue or yellow?”) and the 
outcome (“Was the score high or low?”). As in the first 
experiment, reaction times to the questions were measured 
using a button box and analysed using a 2 (colour: blue vs 
yellow) × 2 (outcome: 2 vs 7) × 2 (question: colour vs out-
come) repeated measures ANOVA.
Results and discussion
Unlike in the previous experiment, no significant three-
way interaction between colour, outcome, and question 
was found, F(1, 27) = 0.27, p = .61, ηp
2 01= .  (Figure 4; see 
Supplementary Material for a full overview of results). 
There was also no interaction between colour and out-
come, F(1, 27) = 2.68, p = .11, ηp
2 09= . . The analysis only 
Figure 3. Overview of conditions and stimuli in Experiment 2.
Figure 4. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for (a) the colour question and (b) the outcome question in Experiment 2, separately for 
shirt-colour cue (indicative of low or high outcome) and outcome (scores 2 and 7).
Heil et al. 2649
showed an interaction between colour and question, 
F(1, 27) = 4.33, p = .05, ηp
2 14= . . To test whether this pat-
tern of results differed from that in Experiment 1, an addi-
tional repeated-measures ANOVA was run with the same 
variables as before and experiment as a between-subjects 
factor. This analysis showed a significant four-way inter-
action between colour/agent, outcome, question, and 
experiment, F(1, 54) = 4.89, p = .03, ηp
2 08= . , confirming 
the difference between the experiments.
As in the previous experiment, additional analyses con-
firmed that including the questions following movies that 
showed another outcome (i.e., 1, 3, 6, and 8) did not influ-
ence this pattern of results. Also, there was no indication that 
the effects were driven by a speed-accuracy trade-off and the 
average accuracy over all trials was 96.6% (96.2% for the 
agent question and 97.0% for the outcome question).
The results do not provide evidence that participants use 
the correlation between the coloured box and the outcome to 
predict the outcome. Whereas in Experiment 1 the correla-
tion between an agent’s skill and an outcome had a causal 
interpretation (i.e., an experienced (or novice) player is more 
likely to cause a high (or low) score outcome), the correla-
tion between colour and outcome in Experiment 2 did not 
have a natural causal interpretation (i.e., according to our 
world knowledge, colours in and of themselves have no 
causal powers to make pins fall down). The difference 
between these experiments is in line with the idea that pre-
dictions during action observation depend on the causal rela-
tion between the predictor and the outcome. However, before 
concluding that the processing of action outcomes indeed 
crucially depends on causal knowledge about agents causing 
outcomes, we need to rule out alternative explanations. In 
Experiment 1, participants were supposed to infer the agent’s 
identity from his shirt colour to answer the agent question. In 
other words, to distinguish the novice and the experienced 
agent, participants could not just focus on directly observa-
ble cues, as they could for distinguishing the two colours in 
Experiment 2. To investigate whether this difference between 
the experiments may account for the findings, we conducted 
a third experiment in which the questions focused only on 
directly observable information from the movies.
Experiment 3
Methods
Participants. A total of 33 participants (31 females) aged 
between 19 and 28 (mean age 22.2) years took part in this 
experiment. The sample size was calculated based on the 
data from Experiment 1, with the assumption that the more 
implicit causal relation between the colour and the out-
come would result in a smaller effect size (it was set at 
50% of that of Experiment 1). One participant was 
excluded from the analyses because the pattern of accu-
racy for the agent question (i.e., 86.5% correct for the 
expected outcome versus 15.6% correct for unexpected 
outcome) suggests that she misunderstood the instructions. 
As in the previous experiments, participants were paid €10 
or received course credits for their participation. The study 
was approved by the local ethics committee and written 
informed consent was obtained from each participant.
Stimuli and design. This experiment was almost exactly the 
same as Experiment 1 in terms of stimuli and design. We 
used the same 24 animated movies and there were 288 trials, 
with a similar distribution as in the previous experiments.
Procedure. The procedure used in this experiment was sim-
ilar to the procedure in Experiment 1. The only difference 
was in the instructions and the questions that were asked 
after each movie. As we did not want to instruct partici-
pants to think about two different agents with different 
skill levels, we only told them to pay attention to the col-
our of the agent’s shirt without mentioning that there may 
be different agents. It was explained to them that the col-
our of the shirt would indicate whether the score was more 
likely to be high or low and, thus, that one colour would 
indicate that the score would probably be low and the other 
colour that the score would probably be high, although this 
would not be always the case. Again, the association 
between the colour and the outcome was mentioned explic-
itly in the practice trials, but not in the actual experiment. 
After each movie, participants answered a question about 
the shirt colour (“Was the shirt purple or white?”) or about 
the outcome (“Was the score high or low?”). Reaction 
times to the questions were measured using a button box 
and analysed using a 2 (shirt colour: white vs purple) × 2 
(outcome: low vs high) × 2 (question: shirt colour vs out-
come) repeated measures ANOVA. Trials were excluded 
from the analysis in the same way as in the previous exper-
iments. There was one trial in which the reaction time was 
below 100 ms, but as it was only one, it was not excluded 
from the analysis.
Results and discussion
Results of the analysis show a three-way interaction 
between shirt colour, outcome, and question, F(1, 31) = 4.21, 
p = .05, ηp
2 12= . , as in Experiment 1 (Figure 5; see 
Supplementary Material for a full overview of results). 
Follow-up analyses showed that for the colour question, 
there was a significant interaction between colour and out-
come, F(1, 31) = 7.07, p = .01, ηp
2 19= . . In paired-samples 
t-tests, unexpected events were found to result in higher 
reaction times for the colour associated with a low score, 
t(1, 31) = −4.28, p < .001, but not for the colour associated 
with a high score, t(1, 31) = 0.17, p = .87. Overall, for the 
colour question, the reaction time to a question following 
an unexpected event was 26.1 ms longer than to a question 
following an expected event. For the outcome question, 
there was no interaction between colour and outcome, 
F(1, 31) = 0.33, p = .57, ηp
2 01= . . For this question, there 
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was a significant effect of outcome on reaction time, 
F(1, 31) = 12.29, p < .01, ηp
2 28= . . A score of 7 resulted in 
a reaction time that was on average 28.2 ms longer than the 
reaction time following a score of 2. This pattern of results 
resembles that of Experiment 1. A repeated measures 
ANOVA with the variables from the previous analysis as 
well as experiment (1 vs 3) as a between-subjects factor 
indeed showed no four-way interaction between agent/col-
our, outcome, question, and experiment, F(1, 58) = 0.67, 
p = .42, ηp
2 01= . .
Again, additional analyses confirmed that including 
the questions following movies that showed another out-
come (i.e., 1, 3, 6, and 8) did not influence this pattern of 
results. As in the other experiments, there was no indica-
tion that the effects were driven by a speed-accuracy 
trade-off and the average accuracy over all trials was 
96.5% (95.2% for the agent question and 97.7% for the 
outcome question).
So although participants were not explicitly instructed 
about different agents with different skill levels, the pat-
tern of results for this experiment is very similar to that of 
the first experiment. This suggests that the difference 
between the first two experiments was not simply caused 
by the fact that one of the questions in Experiment 1 was 
about the agent, which was not directly observable, 
whereas in Experiment 2, both questions were about 
directly observable factors. In Experiment 3, like in 
Experiment 2, the questions focus on colour and outcome, 
both of which are directly observable. The pattern of 
results, however, resembles that of Experiment 1. This is in 
line with the idea that in both Experiments 1 and 3, colour 
is used as a cue to the agent’s identity and the outcome is 
then predicted based on this identity. According to this 
idea, a causal relation between predictor (agent) and 
predicted (outcome) is crucial for predicting the outcomes 
of other people’s actions.
To test the idea that predictions enhance processing in 
terms of speed, we ran an additional analysis in which we 
compared the overall reaction times for all three experi-
ments, using a one-way ANOVA. This analysis indicated 
that the average reaction times differed significantly 
between the experiments, F(2, 85) = 5.16, p < .01, ηp
2 11= . . 
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc comparisons revealed that 
the average reaction time in Experiment 2 (M = 798.8 ms, 
standard deviation [SD] = 124.57) was significantly higher 
than in Experiment 3 (M = 693.81 ms, SD = 108.87), p < .01, 
whereas the average reaction times for Experiment 2 were 
higher than for Experiment 1 (M = 715.64 ms, SD = 159.52), 
although this difference was only marginally significant, 
p = .06. For Experiments 1 and 3, reaction times did not 
differ significantly, p = 1.
Although the questions answered in the three experiments 
were different, the length and difficulty of the questions in 
Experiment 2 cannot account for these findings. Rather, the 
differences in reaction times between the experiments seem 
to suggest that predictions that participants made in 
Experiments 1 and 3 allowed them to respond quickly, 
whereas the inability of participants to use the relation 
between colour and outcome to predict the outcome in 
Experiment 2 resulted in a longer reaction time. This is in line 
with the idea that predictions speed up cognitive processing.
General discussion
In a series of experiments, we investigated whether a pre-
dictive processing model is, in principle, able to account 
for the way in which we process the outcomes of other 
people’s actions. More specifically, we explored a model 
Figure 5. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for (a) the colour question and (b) the outcome question in Experiment 3, separately for 
shirt-colour cue (indicative of low or high outcome) and outcome (scores 2 and 7).
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in which predictions arise in a generative model that has 
a hierarchical structure and consists of causal relations 
between different levels of this hierarchy. The present 
results support the idea that such a model can account for 
this type of processing. To further improve the interpreta-
tion of the data, we developed a computational charac-
terisation of this hierarchical predictive processing model 
to assess to what extent the present experiments’ qualita-
tive pattern of results is consistent with our theoretical 
assumptions. A detailed formal description of this char-
acterisation and the associated processes can be found in 
the Supplementary Material. Here, we will briefly explain 
the characterisation (for a simplified version, see 
Figure 6), before outlining the relation with the experi-
mental findings.
Crucially, the model consists of three levels (agent, out-
come, and visual input), hierarchically ordered from top to 
bottom. Predictions are sent from higher to lower levels. This 
means that the visual input (i.e., the actual configuration of 
pins falling down) is ultimately predicted based on the 
observed shirt colour, through predictions at the outcome and 
agent levels. The relations between the three levels are causal 
in nature (indicated with arrows), whereas the relationship 
between colour and agent (indicated with a line) is determin-
istic. This deterministic relation indicates that the colour of 
the agent’s shirt can be used to identify the agent. This iden-
tification then drives a prediction for the most probable out-
come (two versus seven pins), which in turn drives 
predictions about which exact pins will fall down.
Bottom-up input at the lowest level (i.e., a visual stimu-
lus) that is not fully predicted generates prediction errors. 
These prediction errors represent information about the 
input that was not already anticipated (Rao & Ballard, 
1999) and are instrumental in updating the hypothesis 
(explaining away the prediction error) at a higher level. In 
the predictive processing framework, these prediction 
errors are weighted, which means that top-down and bot-
tom-up information is balanced by altering the gain on 
specific prediction error units (Clark, 2013a; Friston & 
Kiebel, 2009). The prediction error that arises at the level 
of visual input, and is processed at the outcome level above 
it, carries a very low weight because of the irreducible 
uncertainty in this information. This irreducible uncer-
tainty stems from the fact that each outcome is inherently 
associated with many potential configurations of visual 
input (e.g., there are many ways in which 2 out of 10 pins 
can fall down). As a result of this low weight, little addi-
tional processing is going on at the outcome level even if 
some prediction errors arise at the visual level below. On 
the other hand, the prediction error that is sent to the agent 
level carries more weight, as the relation between agent 
and outcome has much more reducible uncertainty and 
thus allows for updating. Therefore, the discrepancy 
between the predicted and the perceived outcome (i.e., the 
number of pins hit) will lead to additional processing at the 
agent level to explain away the high prediction error. 
Presumably, this takes time, and as a consequence, when 
participants answer a question that calls for information 
from this level, the reaction time increases monotonically 
with the size of the prediction error at the level below. In 
this case, the increase in reaction time reflects “explaining 
away” of the prediction errors by updating the hypothesis 
about the current situation. More informally, we could say 
that when participants observe an experienced player hit-
ting only a few pins, their prediction that the outcome is 
most probably high is violated, leading to a relatively high 
prediction error, but this prediction error can be explained 
away based on the knowledge that unpredicted outcomes 
occur every now and then. After the prediction error is 
explained away, the information represented at this level 
can be read and the question can be answered.
With this model in mind, we will now take a closer look 
at the experimental results. In Experiment 1, we found that 
prediction errors at the lower (outcome) level indeed 
slowed down reporting of information at the higher (agent) 
level. This is consistent with the idea that the generative 
model created to predict human actions is structured hier-
archically, as we assume that prediction errors are sent 
upwards from lower levels to higher levels, increasing 
reaction times at this higher level as they are explained 
away. Given that only responses to the agent question and 
not the outcome question were influenced, a non-hierar-
chical representation of the generative model now seems 
less plausible.
In two follow-up experiments, we investigated the idea 
that, at high levels of the hierarchy where agent-caused 
events are represented, the predictive relations between 
levels of the generative model have a causal representation. 
In Experiment 1, participants could use their knowledge 
about the agent to predict the outcome of a bowling action. 
Figure 6. A simplified version of our precise characterisation 
of hierarchical predictive processing.
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A novice player was expected to obtain a low score, whereas 
an experienced player was expected to obtain a high score. 
The relation that is learned here could be represented as a 
causal one: based on general knowledge about the world, 
we know that agents cause outcomes. So when participants 
learned which agent usually got which scores in the bowl-
ing game, they could use this knowledge to base their pre-
diction about the outcome on. In case this knowledge about 
agents and the causal structure of the world would not be 
important, one would expect that changing the agent infor-
mation to another informative cue would result in the same 
pattern of reaction times. Therefore, in the second experi-
ment, we used a cue with the same predictive probabilities 
as the agent. It has previously been suggested that predic-
tions are based on simple associations and the contiguity 
and contingency between a cue and an outcome determine 
whether a prediction will be made (Keysers & Gazzola, 
2014). Contiguity describes the paired occurrence of the 
cue and the outcome, whereas contingency implies that one 
event (i.e., the colour cue or the agent) reliably predicts the 
other (i.e., the outcome). Thus, the contiguity and contin-
gency between the cue and the outcome were exactly the 
same in all three experiments. The second experiment dif-
fered from the other experiments in terms of the type of 
relation that could be learned. Here, this relation was not a 
causal one between an agent and an outcome, but a purely 
stochastic one between a colour and an outcome. In terms 
of the model presented in Figure 6, predictions about action 
outcomes cannot be based on a colour because this colour 
is not intrinsically linked to an agent, as the representation 
of colour does not have a causal relation with the represen-
tation of the outcome at the level below. This is in agree-
ment with a suggestion that we have made elsewhere (Heil, 
van Pelt, Kwisthout, van Rooij, & Bekkering, 2014): the 
degree to which two events are associated can be guided by 
beliefs about the causal structure of the world. For exam-
ple, people can only be conditioned to blink their eyes 
when they hear a tone in case they are aware of the relation 
between the tone and a puff of air to the eye that caused 
them to blink (Clark & Squire, 1998). In the same way, 
Waldmann (2000) found that the blocking effect in condi-
tioning (i.e., the effect that the association of an event A 
with event Y is prevented if A is presented together with 
another event B that has previously been associated with 
event Y) is modulated by whether the participants were led 
to believe that A and B were either possible causes or pos-
sible effects of Y. It seems that awareness of a causal rela-
tion between two events influences the way in which these 
events are processed: if people do not interpret two events 
as causally related, they are not as easily associated, as is 
the case when an arbitrary colour correlates with a certain 
outcome in our bowling setting. We therefore suggest that 
the lack of a causal interpretation in Experiment 2 results in 
a pattern of reaction times that does not distinguish between 
predicted and unpredicted outcomes, even though 
participants were made aware that there was a statistical 
relation between the colour of the box and the outcome.
In Experiment 3, participants could again base their 
predictions on a causal relation between an agent and an 
outcome, but this experiment was designed to control for 
some of the differences between the two previous experi-
ments. We used the same stimuli as in the first experiment, 
but asked the participants to answer questions about 
directly observable features, as in the second experiment. 
Next to reporting the outcome, participants reported the 
colour of the agent’s shirt. Similar to Experiment 1, reac-
tion times to the colour question (which is comparable 
with the agent question) were again influenced by predic-
tions about the outcome. These findings are in line with the 
idea that the brain’s predictive model of other agent’s 
actions consists of causal relationships between different 
levels in a hierarchy.
Previous studies investigating the role of causality in 
cognitive processing already showed that whether or not 
two events are perceived to be causally related depends on 
prior knowledge. This knowledge may, for example, con-
cern the causal mechanism (Shultz et al., 1986), the prob-
ability that a causal relation exists or the assumed 
functional form (i.e., deterministic or probabilistic) of this 
relation (Griffiths, Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2011). 
Importantly, this study extends these findings by showing 
that if events are perceived to be causally related, this 
allows for the prediction of one event based on the other, 
which then enhances cognitive processing. It seems that 
the world model that we use to predict other people’s 
actions and their outcomes revolves around causes and 
their effects.
This does not mean that it is impossible to make predic-
tions based on arbitrary cues. Previous studies actually 
showed prediction effects for arbitrarily associated events 
(e.g., Kok et al., 2012). Conceivably, in the clearly non-
arbitrary setting that we created in our experiment, rele-
vant world knowledge is activated, whereas this is not the 
case for studies in which arbitrary events are associated. 
For example, in the study by Kok et al. (2012), an auditory 
cue was the only source of information available to predict 
the orientation of the visual stimulus. The richness of 
information in our experiments may have made it more 
difficult to associate an arbitrary cue with an action out-
come. This potential difference in the associations that are 
learned in arbitrary versus non-arbitrary settings demon-
strates the importance of naturalistic, ecologically valid 
experimental designs in which a causal relation can be 
inferred. For example, when studying hierarchical predic-
tive processing of agent-caused events, as we do here, it is 
important to take into account that the structure of the hier-
archy may depend on the causal relation between agent 
and outcome. We suggest that knowing that agents cause 
outcomes allows us to predict an outcome based on knowl-
edge about the agent.
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Importantly, predictive processing is assumed to 
enhance processing in terms of speed. A comparison 
between the overall reaction times in the different experi-
ments indeed revealed that in cases in which we found that 
participants were able to predict the outcomes (i.e., 
Experiments 1 and 3), processing was speeded up com-
pared with cases in which we found no evidence for these 
predictions (i.e., Experiment 2). This is in line with the 
idea that predictions enhance processing in terms of speed 
and shows the potential benefit of predictive processing as 
a more general mechanism.
Although our results show that the predictive process-
ing framework is able to account for reaction time effects 
in the processing of another person’s action outcomes, it is 
also important to consider possible alternative explana-
tions. For instance, in contrast to predictive processing, 
other accounts may not assign a key role to predictions and 
prediction errors. An example of such a non-predictive 
explanation would be an account in which probabilistic 
inference takes place only after the observation of the 
events. One could, for instance, hypothesise that the infer-
ence of a less probable event requires more processing 
time than inference of a more probable event, resulting in 
a longer reaction time for an agent that is not probable 
given the outcome. Such an account can be substantiated, 
however, only insofar as there is a plausible mechanism 
that explains why lower probability events take longer to 
process. Even if this is granted, such an account would 
need to make additional assumptions to explain the exact 
pattern of results. For example, without additional assump-
tions, the account cannot explain the difference between 
the two questions, as both need to be inferred and both deal 
with a similar pattern of low and high probability.
However, it is important to note that many models of cog-
nition may actually be integrated in the predictive processing 
framework. For example, claims arising from associative 
theories, such as the associative sequence learning model, do 
not necessarily oppose those of the predictive processing 
framework. Press, Heyes, and Kilner (2011) argue that the 
associative sequence learning model explains how relations 
are learned, whereas predictive processing explains how 
learned relations support inferences about other people’s 
actions. In this sense, the two models complement each other 
because they simply address different questions.
Future research is needed to investigate whether a pre-
dictive processing model with a hierarchical structure and 
causal relations between its levels can also account for dif-
ferent types of cognitive processing. Also, it would be 
interesting to further disentangle the different processes 
that may underlie explaining away of the prediction error. 
In case of hypothesis updating, the probability distribution 
over the candidate hypotheses is reassessed, whereas the 
generative model remains stable. On the other hand, revi-
sion of the generative model, sensory sampling to obtain 
more information on the unpredicted event, and active 
inference have been proposed as alternative ways to bring 
prediction and sensory input closer together (Kwisthout, 
Bekkering, & van Rooij, 2017). For example, if the rela-
tion between a certain agent and a certain outcome changes 
in the course of an experiment (e.g., when the novice 
bowler gets better), participants need to revise their model.
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